Tag Archive for AES

Copier Security Best Practices

Copier Security Best PracticesMulti-function printers (MFP) can scan, copy, fax, and print. The lowly office copier can now send emails, host web-based administrative pages, and even tell you when the ink is low. While doing all that, MFPs can store image files on onboard hard drives, which can contain sensitive, personally identifiable information (PII). Compliance with standards/laws such as PCI-DSS, HIPAA, Sarbanes Oxley, state privacy laws, etc., may force MFPs to be secured.

MFP printer SecureState suggests some general questions to ask when trying to understand the criticality of these copier systems and to show some due diligence:

• Are these devices accessible on the network? If so, how is “Administrative” access controlled?
• How long are the image files retained on these systems?
• If the copier is compromised, can the attackers capture sensitive data?
• If a hard drive fails, does the replacement process follow the usual standard for securely destroying the disk?
• What are some of the services enabled on these devices? Is there an administrative website, SNMP client, or SMTP server? How about the accounts and passwords of the administrative websites; are they set to default accounts and passwords?

SecureState says If you answered “No” or “I don’t know” to these questions, some of the issues more than likely need to be addressed.

Just like any network appliance, MFPs and other print devices are small computers connected to the network that have memory, storage, processors, an operating system, and full-fledged web servers. These devices can hold sensitive information. Before that old printer is decommissioned, ensure the copier hard drive is securely wiped. If the existing device does not have advanced security options such as disk encryption or immediately overwriting data, the hard drive should be removed and securely wiped or destroyed separately before being decommissioned.

Recommended best practices

Recommended best practices for multi-function printers and copiers with disk drives:

  • Review vendor security configuration guides
  • Develop a standard configuration and check regularly
  • Enable immediate image to overwrite and schedule regular off-hours overwrite (DoD 3 pass)
  • Enable encryption (minimum 128-bit AES)
  • Use encryption and secure protocols such as IPSec, SSL, and SNMPv3 if network-enabled.
  • Regularly review copier vendor security bulletins.
  • Enable authentication and authorization (if possible, use network credentials)
  • Change admin password regularly
  • Enable audit log and review periodically
  • Treat network-enabled devices like any other computer on the network
  • Purchase a device that has an EAL2 Common Criteria certification

If the copier processes restricted data, it MUST have encryption and image overwrite. For devices that process restricted data but do not have the necessary security features:

  • Data destructionIf possible, buy the required security modules and enable the features.
  • If security features cannot be purchased or enabled, replace the copier as soon as appropriate and have the hard drive removed and destroyed.

By Copier Vendor

XeroxXerox—Newer Xerox (XRX) devices have security features that often need to be turned on. For more information, see the Xerox Information Security Guides.

RicohRicoh—Security options for Ricoh’s (7752) have to be purchased separately. For more information, see the Ricoh Common Security Features Guide (PDF).

CanonCanon—Security options for Canon (CAJ) devices must be purchased separately. For more information, see Canon Security Solutions for iR and iP Devices (PDF).

HP – All HP (HPQ) multi-function printers have hard drives.

  • HPThere is a disk-wipe utility for all MFPs.
  • This utility is not installed by default and must be downloaded from HP.COM. It is protected by an admin account and password.
  • The admin can configure the utility to do a printer disk wipe daily.
  • Some non-MFP HP printers may have hard drives. These printers will have an occupied EIO card (with a resident hard drive) in the slot next to the network card. Viewing the printer’s external case, this EIO card should be physically evident.
  • Third-party disk wipe utility cannot be used against HP MFP hard drives without removing the drive from the card, which is likely to damage the card and, possibly, the hard drive.
  • Non-MFPs with hard drives are rare and may be purchased for particular purposes.
  • Non-MFPs with hard drives and network connections can be remotely disk wiped. Non-MFPs with a hard drive but without a network connection need to be handled by HP.
  • The agreements should include a defective media retention provision for leased HP printers that permits the lessor to keep the hard drive before releasing the printer.
  • The WebJetAdmin tool, downloadable from HP.COM, can scan a network subnet and identify HP printers (and non-HP printers if the tool has an MIB for the non-HP printer).
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Richard Nixon

All they focused on was the costs; they did not ask any of the due diligence questions pointed out in this post. They had no plans on wiping the HDDs on the 12 networked copy/scan/print Ricohs. It is pretty clear that all the info on the HDDs was bound for South America or else on the secondary market, as I wrote about here.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

WPA Gone in 60 Seconds

WPA Gone in 60 SecondsJapanese researchers have identified a WPA hack that could give hackers a way to read encrypted Wi-Fi traffic  in less than 1 minute. Toshihiro Ohigashi (Hiroshima University) and Masakatu Morii (Kobe University) presented a way to break the WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) encryption system at the Joint Workshop on Information Security. The researchers outlined their work in a paper called “A Practical Message Falsication Attack on WPA” on August 7, 2009.

The new attack builds on 2008 research from Darmstadt University of Technology graduate students Martin Beck and Erik Tews who proved that WPA Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) could be attacked. The Beck-Tews attack only worked on short packets in a WPA implementation that supported 802.11 quality of service (QOS) features and took between 12 and 15 minutes to work.

The new threat uses “man in the middle” (MITM) attacks on WPA TKIP systems. The MITM attack uses the “chopchop” attack on a short packet (like ARP broadcasts), decipher its 64-bit Message Integrity Code (MIC), and can then craft whatever packet it wants. The new packet is coded with the proper checksums and passed along to the access point, which should accept it as genuine. Dragos Ruiu, organizer of the PacSec security conference where the first WPA hack was demonstrated told IDGNews, “They took this stuff which was fairly theoretical and they’ve made it much more practical.”

Both attacks work only on WPA systems that use the TKIP algorithm. The new attack does not work on newer WPA2 devices or on WPA systems that use the stronger Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. Kelly Davis-Felner, marketing director with the Wi-Fi Alliance, said that people should now use WPA2. She told IDGNews, WPA with TKIP “was developed as kind of an interim encryption method as Wi-Fi security was evolving several years ago.”

Enterprise Wi-Fi networks typically include security software that would detect the type of man-in-the-middle attack described by the Japanese researchers, Robert Graham, CEO of Errata Security told ars technica. He continues, the development of the first really practical attack against WPA should give people a reason to dump WPA with TKIP, he said. “It’s not as bad as WEP, but it’s also certainly bad.”

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This is only an issue if the WLAN is secured at all.  Motorola published a report in April 2009  that says 64% of companies are neglecting WLAN security. The report claims that only 47% of companies are using Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) encryption on their wireless networks.

These attacks highlight the weaknesses of TKIP-based WLAN encryption. WPA TKIP was developed to fix the worst of the security holes in the first Wi-Fi encryption protocol, WEP. WI-Fi-certified products have had to support WPA2 since March 2006 . Users should move to AES-CCMP which requires WPA2 Personal for home and small office networks or WPA2 Enterprise for larger networks.

Using AES-CCMP may require that some network equipment installed before 2003 be reviewed as AES supports key lengths up to 256 bits, which may not be compatible with older hardware. Any remaining equipment of this vintage may need to be upgraded to newer Wi-Fi adapters, switched to Ethernet only, or retired. WPA2 has not shown any vulnerabilities to date. There is no real good reason to try to secure your WLAN with WPA-TKIP anymore.

 

Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

Home Wireless Equipment Revenues to Double

Wireless Takes Over Home NetworksHome wireless networking equipment revenues are set to double according to In-Stat. Ethernet LANs have given way to wireless technologies. The market research firm forecasts that equipment revenues from home networking will climb from almost $9 billion in 2004 to over $21 billion in 2009. They further notes that the home wireless market is now dominated by multi-band 54Mbps 802.11g devices, as the number of installed home networks worldwide grew by 13 million from 2003 to 37 million in 2004. The company also finds that home networking equipment is continuing to drop in price while increasing functionality such as wireless and VoIP are being integrated. Silicon prices, higher volumes, and competition have all contributed toward aggressive pricing, says In-Stat.

 

Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.