Tag Archive for DDOS

IVR Security Threats

IVR Security ThreatsOn his excellent VoIP/UC Security Blog, Mark Collier points to some interesting work on Interactive Voice Response (IVR) security threats by Rahul Sasi. IVR systems are used in phone banking, call centers, hospitals, and corporations mainly for information retrieval and account management via phone lines. As a security researcher for iSIGHT Partners, Sasi is doing research on a variety of security vulnerabilities that may be present in IVRs.

The author says that IVR security threats are present in IVR systems used for financial transactions. Sasi presented some of his findings at Hack In The Box Malaysia 2011 and the video is available here. Collier summarizes the IVR security threats in his blog:

  • Telcom closetInformation harvesting – for account numbers and PINs, guessing a static 4-digit PIN for a range of account numbers. The odds of a hit are pretty good. Some IVRs lock the account but reset at midnight.
  • Injection – through the input of spoken words (“test”, “.”, “com”, etc.), supporting VXML servers can be fingerprinted, affected, and possibly even crashed.
  • DTMF DoS – by entering a large number of tones or adjusting frequency/tone duration, it may be possible to affect or crash DTMF processing software in IVRs. This could be particularly nasty, as DTMF processing is very common.

Collier concludes that since most of these IVR attacks simply involve the transmission of DTMF, they are very easy to execute and automate. These vulnerabilities could impact any IVR, whether it is TDM, VoIP, the latest UC.

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None of these issues seem new to me, they are just new applications of old attack vectors.

  • Ma Nell telephone operatorsWho remembers blue boxes or the most famous phone phreak John “Captain Crunch” Draper.
  • Info harvesting is a typical technique in web 2.0. Attackers successfully harvest personal info from websites like LinkedIn all the time.
  • Does VXML injection = SQL injection? time for the programmers to step up.
  • DTMF DOS can lead to a buffer-overflow, are your systems patched? 

All in all these vulnerabilities create IVR security threats.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

40 Years of Malware – Part 3

40 Years of Malware - Part 32011 marks the 40th anniversary of the computer virus. Help Net Security notes that over the last four decades, malware instances have grown from 1,300 in 1990, to 50,000 in 2000, to over 200 million in 2010. Fortinet (FTNT) marks this dubious milestone with an article that counts down some of the malware evolution low-lights.

The Sunnyvale, CA network security firm says that viruses evolved from academic proof of concepts to geek pranks which have evolved into cybercriminal tools. By 2005, the virus scene had been monetized, and almost all viruses developed for the sole purpose of making money via more or less complex business models. According to FortiGuard Labs, the most significant computer viruses over the last 40 years are:

See Part 1 HereSee Part 2 Here – See Part 3 Here  – See Part 4 Here

Code Red Worm2001 – E-mail and the Internet become primary transmission vectors for malware by 2001 as scripts automatically load viruses from infected Websites. The Code Red worm targeted Web servers and not users. By exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft IIS servers Code Red automatically spread to nearly 400,000 servers in less than one week. The Code red worm replaced the homepage of the compromised websites with a “Hacked By Chinese!” page.  Code Red had a distinguishing feature designed to flood the White House Website with traffic (from the infected servers), probably making it the first case of documented ‘hacktivism’ on a large scale.

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, the Nimda worm (admin spelled backward) infected hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide. Nimda is one of the most complicated viruses, having many different methods of infecting computers systems and duplicating itself.

Microsoft SQL Server2003 – Widespread Internet attacks emerge as SQL Slammer (or Sapphire) infects the memory in servers worldwide, clogging networks and causing shutdowns. on January 25, 2003, Slammer first appeared as a single-packet, 376-byte worm that generated random IP addresses and sent itself to those IP addresses. If the IP address was a computer running an unpatched copy of Microsoft’s (MSFT) SQL Server Desktop Engine, that computer would immediately begin firing the virus off to random IP addresses. Slammer was remarkably effective at spreading, it infected 75,000 computers in 10 minutes. The explosion of traffic overloaded routers across the globe, which created higher demands on other routers, which shut them down, and so on.

The summer of 2003 saw the release of both the Blaster and Sobig worms. Blaster (aka Lovsan or MSBlast) was the first to hit. The worm was detected on August 11 and spread rapidly, peaking in just two days. Transmitted via network and Internet traffic, this worm exploited a vulnerability in Windows 2000 and Windows XP, and when activated, presented the PC user with a menacing dialog box indicating that a system shutdown was imminent.

The Sobig worm hit right on the heels of Blaster. The most destructive variant was Sobig.F, which generated over 1 million copies of itself in its first 24 hours. The worm infected host computers via e-mail attachments such as application.pif and thank_you.pif. When activated, the worm transmitted itself to e-mail addresses discovered on a host of local file types. The result was massive amounts of Internet traffic. Microsoft has announced a $250,000 bounty for anyone who identifies Sobig.F’s author, but to date, the perpetrator has not been caught.

Sasser shutdown2004 – The Sasser worm built on the autonomous nature of Code Red. It spread without anyone’s help by exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows XP and Windows 2000 operating systems called the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service or LSASS. Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-011 here. This is the first widespread Windows malware, made even more annoying by a bug in the worm’s code, that turned infected systems off every couple of minutes.

This is the first time that systems whose function isn’t normally related to the Internet (and that mostly existed before the Internet) were severely affected. Sasser infected more than one million systems. The damage amount is thought to be more than $18 billion.

Bagle was first detected in 2004, it infected users through an email attachment, and used email to spread itself. Unlike earlier mass-mailing viruses, Bagle did not rely on the MS Outlook contact list rather it harvested email addresses from various document files stored in the infected computer to attack. Bagle opened a backdoor where a hacker could gain access and control of the infected computer. Through the backdoor, the attacker could download more components to either spy and steal information from the user or launch DDoS attacks.

MyDoom is another mass-mailing worm discovered in 2004. It spread primarily through email but it also attacked computers by infecting programs stored in the shared folder of the Peer-to-Peer software KaZaA. MyDoom slowed down global Internet access by ten percent and caused some website access to be reduced by 50 percent. It is estimated that during the first few days, one out of ten email messages sent contained the virus.

2005 – In 2005 Sony BMG introduced secret DRM software to report music copying; Other rootkits appear, providing hidden access to systems.

MyTob appeared in 2005 and was one of the first worms to combine a botnet and a mass-mailer. MyTob marks the emergence of cybercrime. The cybercriminals developed business models to “monetize” botnets that installed spyware, sent spam, hosted illegal content, and intercepted banking credentials, etc. The revenue generated from these new botnets quickly reached billions of dollars per year today.

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By 2005 cybercriminals are starting to put all the parts together, Slammer proves that Microsoft systems can be used to spread attacks, Blaster and SoBig improved the infection rate, Bagel began to mine the targets for data and install backdoors so the attackers could continue to re-use the victims’ systems. MyDoom stated to use the first social network, the P2P networks for attacks. Sony proved that rootkits could be widely distributed and MyTob was the first of the modern botnet, leading the world into today’s monetized cybercrime age, described in part 4.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

Online Security Threats Growing

Online Security Threats GrowingDarkReading is reporting that Ann Arbor-based Arbor Networks has issued its fourth Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. The global report is based on responses from 70 lead security engineers worldwide. Some of the report’s findings are that DDoS attacks have grown a hundredfold since 2000 and the newest threat is increasing service-level attacks

Arbor Networks logoRespondents to the survey said the main threat vectors for attacks experienced during August 2007 to July 2008, were:

  • external, brute force attacks (61%)
  • known vulnerabilities (12 %)
  • social engineering (3%)
  • misconfiguration (3%)
  • none from zero-day threats.

Brute force attacks, such as DDoS, jumped 67 percent over the last year. ISPs reportedly spent most of their available security resources combating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Flood-based attacks represented 42 percent of the attacks reported and protocol exhaustion-based attacks at 24 percent last year. DDoS attacks have grown from megabit levels in 2000 to 40-gigabit attacks this year. Nearly 60 percent of ISPs worldwide say they experienced DDoS attacks larger than 1 gigabit-per-second (Gbps) to a record 40 Gbps, according to Arbor’s report. Arbor also indicates the growth in attack size continues to significantly outpace the corresponding increase in underlying transmission speed and ISP infrastructure investment according to Danny McPherson, chief security officer for Arbor Networks.

Bandwidth bottleneckThe report indicates that the ISPs surveyed are less worried about DDoS attacks than they were a year ago. This year ISPs describe a far more diversified range of threats, more than half are battling an increase in service-level attacks which accounted for 17 percent of all attacks, that attempt to exploit vulnerabilities and limitations of computing resources. New attacks are being directed at new services, as ISP’s work to diversify their income sources by expanding into content distribution, VoIP or other managed services. These new threats include:

  • domain name system (DNS) spoofing
  • border gateway protocol (BGP) hijacking
  • spam.

Almost half of the surveyed ISPs now consider their DNS services vulnerable. Others expressed concern over related service delivery infrastructure, including voice over IP (VoIP) session border controllers (SBCs) and load balancers. Several ISPs reported multi-hour outages of prominent Internet services during the last year due to application-level attacks.

Botnets are still a big problem for ISPs. Botnets continue their expansion across the Internet. ISP’s report that botnet used for:

  • SPAM (36%)
  • DDoS (31%)
  • phishing (28%)
  • ID fraud (>5%)
  • click fraud (>5%)

Rob Malan, founder and chief technology officer of Arbor Networks explained that, with application-based attacks, bot-infected computers worldwide make connections to a targeted site, then “use an application protocol to deliver a perfectly valid request, not a vulnerability, not something that an IDS or other type of firewall would necessarily flag”. For example, a botnet might instruct its zombie computers worldwide to do a back-end query off a database. “By itself, it’s not bad but, if you have multiple such requests, then you tie up the application – in this case, database – resources on the back-end,” he said.

Even the newest technologies are not secure, 55 percent of ISPs see the scale and frequency of IPv6 attacks increasing. “They are asked to deploy V6, but they don’t feel they can have security [with it],” Dr. Craig Labovitz chief scientist for Arbor Networks says. Today’s IPS/IDS, firewall, and other tools don’t have the proper visibility into IPv6 networks to secure them, he says. Arbor Networks released an earlier study in August 2008 which revealed negligible IPv6 usage.

The response capability of the respondents is mixed. The majority of ISPs report that they can detect DDoS attacks using tools. This year also shows significant adoption of inline mitigation infrastructure and a migration away from less discriminate techniques like blocking all customer traffic (including legitimate traffic) via routing announcements. Many ISPs also report deploying walled-garden and quarantine infrastructure to combat botnets.

Despite the tools, on hand, only a few of the surveyed ISPs said they have the capability to mitigate DDoS attacks in 10 minutes or less. Even fewer providers have the infrastructure to defend against service-level attacks or this year’s reported peak of a 40-gigabit flood attack.

Even less of an emphasis is placed on finding the criminals responsible for these attacks. Arbor Networks found that ISPs have faith in law-enforcement bodies. Nearly two-thirds of respondents indicated that they do not believe law enforcement has the means to act upon the information they provide about attacks or other security incidents. “It’s hard on carriers,” said Malan. “They get paid on traffic, not to do forensic analysis. So it’s hard from their perspective to make the economics work.”

The Arbor Networks 2008 Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report describes a networked world where DDoS attacks growth has outpaced the ability of firms to respond to them and new service level attacks are driven by botnet’s are matching the firm’s efforts to diversify their service offerings to customers. These facts when combined with the current economic recession, the networked world still appears to be a difficult place to do business.

 

Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.