Tag Archive for Radware

Security Considerations for IPv6

Security Considerations for IPv6For those who missed the Internet Society (ISOC) announcement that World IPv6 Launch day arrived on June 6. (I blogged about World IPv6 day, back in March) Carl Herberger, VP of Security at Radware (RDWR) recently wrote at Help Net Security that he sees World IPv6 Launch day as much more hype than an operational change.

Internet Society logoMany high-profile organizations have hooked their plans on change over to the ISOC launch date. Supporters include Google (GOOG), Facebook (FB), Microsoft (MSFT) Bing, Yahoo (YHOO), and Akamai (AKAM).  Mr. Herberger points out that many companies have already leveraged IPv6 WAN connectivity. Most mobile providers who have adopted LTE 4G infrastructures have built them for mobile devices, Mobile devices will connect to the Internet with IPv6 addresses by default. He argues that since a 4G phone must also be 3G and IPv4 compatible, the 5G providers have not done much. The service providers have woven IPv6 into the existing IPv4 Internet much to the chagrin of the initial IPv6 designers.

IPv6 Pandora’s Box

Bottom line: Because IPv4 is not going away any time soon, we will essentially live in perpetuity with both designs. A new dawn? Or the beginning of the end? The Radware VP thinks it’s neither, he calls the interoperability issues between IPv4 and IPv6, a Pandora’s Box of opportunity for those of the nefarious persuasion.

So, what are the three main takeaways from World IPv6 Launch day?

Take away #1

Dog and catIPv6 will first be implemented on the WAN, IPv4 will continue to stay in the LAN for years to come – Google, Facebook, DNS, CDN providers, and many, if not most ISP’s are all moving to default IPv6 WAN connectivity. However, nearly no one has made the transition to IPv6 on the LAN. Mr. Herberger adds that rapid IPv6 deployment on the Internet WAN operations side and the very slow rollout of IPv6 on the LAN side will wreak havoc on perimeter security. He believes that there are huge problems associated with IPv4 and IPv6 cohabitating.

Take away #2

IPv6 & IPv4 don’t cohabitate well – IPv6 and IPv4 make insecure bedfellows. There are no predefined standards in the way to handle the cohabitation of IPv4 with IPv6.  The transition mechanisms to ease the transitioning of the Internet from its first IPv4 infrastructure to IPv6 have not been standardized yet. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has working groups and discussions through the IETF Internet-Drafts and Requests for Comments processes to develop these methods. Some basic IPv6 transition mechanisms have been defined; however, nothing has yet emerged as a proposed uniform standard. As such, the article states, the world is awash with a plethora of IPv4 to IPv6 (and vice versa) Transition Mechanisms such as:

  • Encapsulating IPv4 in IPv6 (or 4in6)
  • Encapsulating IPv6 in IPv4 (or 6in4)IPv6 tunnel
  • IPv6 over IPv4 (6over4)
  • DS-Lite
  • 6rd
  • 6to4
  • ISATAP
  • NAT64 / DNS64
  • Teredo
  • SIIT.

If you are familiar with network perimeter security devices, one of the things they do well is deep packet inspection and Stateful aware analysis. However, one of the dirty little secrets is that nearly none of today’s technologies have the capability to inspect encrypted traffic such as SSL  or the ability to inspect tunneling protocols such as L2TP, PPTP, etc. What IPv4 and IPv6 transition does is effectively exacerbate these “Achilles heels” in security detection capabilities by introducing a whole new class of nearly undetectable transmissions. The author warns Don’t be fooled by a vendor’s claim that they inspect a v4 packet in v6 or vice versa, because even if true for one or two methodologies, the ways to carry out this task are almost immeasurable today. This is really a true community-wide problem and one that must be addressed.

Take away #3

ConfusedMeet your old vulnerability – Same as the new vulnerability! Much of our defense is single-threaded, and should an adversary be able to pass through your perimeter defenses, many of the ‘older’ vulnerabilities would find a receptive home having passed through the ‘corporate scrubbers.’Moreover, just think of the new opportunities available to more nefarious organizations that don’t have your interests in mind. This ‘transition mechanism’ essentially becomes an effective ‘unscrubbed’ gateway or tunnel for all newly developed organized crime-designed, state-sponsored, and Hacktivist-motivated attacks.

Moreover, most of us will be largely blind to these realities unless we are acting now to make certain that our gateways are designed with all encapsulated traffic being detected and mitigated. Anomaly detection takes center stage here and signature tools will leave you wanting.

The Radware VP concludes that this problem requires action on behalf of security professionals to solve; you HAVE to do something different because the inertia path will leave you vulnerable.

Related articles

Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.