Tag Archive for 2FA

ATM Jackpotting

ATM JackpottingThe U.S. Secret Service has warned (PDF) financial institutions of logical (jackpot) attacks on Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). These ATM attacks originated in Mexico and have spread to the US. These jackpotting attacks are an industry-wide issue and as one vendor stated, are “a call to action to take appropriate steps to protect their ATMs against these forms of attack and mitigate any consequences.”

The attack mode involves a series of steps to defeat the ATM’s existing security mechanisms and the authorization process for setting the communication within the ATM. Internal communications are used when computer components like the mainboard or the hard disk have to be exchanged for legitimate reasons.

Description of an ATM attack

Automated Teller Machines (ATMs)In a Jackpotting attack, the criminal gains access to the internal infrastructure of the terminal to infect the ATM PC or by completely exchanging the hard disk (HDD). There are a number of steps the attacker has to take for this type of attack:

  1. The top of the ATM must be opened.
  2. The original hard disk of the ATM is removed and replaced by another hard disk, which the attackers have loaded with an unauthorized and/or stolen image of ATM platform software.
  3. In order to pair this new hard drive with the dispenser, the dispenser communication needs to be reset, which is only allowed when the safe door is open. A cable in the ATM is unplugged to fool the machine into allowing the crooks to add their bogus hard drive to the ATM.
  4. A dedicated button inside the safe needs to be pressed and held to start the dispenser communication. The crooks insert an extension into existing gaps next to the presenter to depress the button. CCTV footage has shown that criminals use an industrial endoscope to complete the taskATM's

In other Jackpotting attacks, portions of a third-party multi-vendor application software stack to drive ATM components are used. Brian Krebs at Krebs on Security reports that Secret Service issued a warning that organized criminal gangs have been attacking stand-alone ATMs in the United States using “Ploutus.D,” an advanced strain of jackpotting malware first spotted in 2013.

Mr. Krebs also reports that “During previous attacks, fraudsters dressed as ATM technicians and attached a laptop computer with a mirror image of the ATMs operating system along with a mobile device to the targeted ATM. Once this is complete, fraudsters own the ATM and it will appear Out of Service to potential customers according to the confidential Secret Service alert. At this point, the crook(s) installing the malware will contact co-conspirators who can remotely control the ATMs and force the machines to dispense cash.

In previous Ploutus.D attacks, the ATM Dispensed at a rate of 40 bills every 23 secondscontinuously dispensed at a rate of 40 bills every 23 seconds,” the alert continues. Once the dispense cycle starts, the only way to stop it is to press cancel on the keypad. Otherwise, the machine is completely emptied of cash, according to the alert. While there are some risks of the money mule being caught by cameras, the speed in which the operation is carried out minimizes the mule’s risk.”

Specific Guidance and Recommendations

The most common forms of logical attack against ATMs are “Black Box” and “Offline Malware”. The steps to minimize the risks to ATMs are the same as any other enterprise device.

  1. Make sure firmware and software are current with the latest updates, are important protections to mitigate the impact of Black Box attacks. Four out of five cash machines still run Win XP or Win XP Embedded. The Secret Service alert says ATMs still running on Windows XP are particularly vulnerable, and it urged ATM operators to update to at least Windows 7 to defeat this specific type of attack.
  2. Use secure hard drive encryption protections against Offline Malware
  3. Use a secure BIOS remote control app to lock the ATM BIOS configuration and protect the configuration with a password.
  4. Deploying an application whitelisting solution.
  5. Limit Physical Access to the ATM:
    • Use appropriate locking mechanisms to secure the head compartment of the ATM.
    • Control access to areas used by staff to service the ATM.
    • Implement two-factor authentication (2FA) controls for service technicians.
  6. Set up secure monitoring
  7. Use the most secure configuration of encrypted communications. In cases where the complete hard disk is being exchanged, encrypted communications between ATM PC and dispenser protect against the attack.
    • Ensure proper hardening and real-time monitoring of security-relevant hardware and software events.
    • Investigate suspicious activities like deviating or non-consistent transaction or event patterns, which are caused by an interrupted connection to the dispenser. Monitor unexpected opening of the top hat compartment of the ATM.

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Followers of the Bach Seat know how to secure their PCs, I have written about securing PCs many times here. So the question is why not ATMs? Research says that consumers go into the branch less every year. The experts say that by 2022 customers will visit a branch only 4 times a year. In many cases, ATMs are the bank’s surrogates for most cash transactions. It makes sense to get it right.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

DUO Expands Into Detroit

-Updated 08/02/2018 – Lumbering behemoth Cisco (CSCO) is buying Duo for $2.35B in cash. Hopefully, it will go better for Duo, Ann Arbor and Detroit than Cisco’s other purchase Flip and Linksys.

DUO Expands Into DetroitThe Ann Arbor Michigan-based cybersecurity tech company DUO Security continues to grow. The start-up has grown so much that they are moving part of their operation from Ann Arbor to Detroit Michigan. MLive reports that DUO will move 30 staff members into a shared workspace at Bamboo Detroit in the Madison Building at 1420 Washington Blvd. Employees moving to Detroit include those working in Duo’s engineering, information services, and product teams, the statement said.

DUO SecurityAt least 350 of Duo’s 500 employees work at Michigan locations, including two in Ann Arbor, where the company was founded in 2010. Duo Security CEO and co-founder Dug Song told MLive, “We are exploring options for how we continue to grow, but we’re committed to Michigan … We intend to stay here in Ann Arbor.”

To better support, its customer base Duo Security plans to expand its Detroit footprint by the end of 2018. The cybersecurity firm plans to occupy a 9,000-square-foot suite on the Madison Building’s sixth floor. DUO’s customer base includes over 10,000 companies like Facebook (PDF), Etsy, Toyota, the University of Michigan, Yelp, and Zillow.

Duo’s software-as-a-service (SaaS) secures more than 300 million logins a month. Xconomy Detroit explains that the heart of Duo’s business-to-business technology is two-factor authentication (2FA). 2FA is a method of confirming the identity of a user by sending a code to the user’s device, usually their phone. Duo’s software can also check the health of its customers’ devices, and block access to those deemed risky.

Jon Oberheide, Duo’s co-founder and CTO, told Xconomy, the Duo platform ensures that only trusted users and devices can access protected applications. Implementation of the system takes less than a week for 75% of Duo’s customers. Mr. Oberheide explains why DUO is so successful,

An organization’s physical perimeter used to be its four walls, but that has really dissolved with VPNs (virtual private networks). You have some people using their own devices, some using company devices, and people working in different locations. A security program in that environment looks really different—it becomes really important to protect single log-ins.

CEO Song told MLive the move is an opportunity to build on Detroit’s history of innovation,

Detroit MichiganDetroit has always moved the world, both in body and soul, through its industry and art … We are proud to help invest in the historic resurgence of Detroit, excited to learn and grow together, and committed to a success much greater than ourselves.

Duo currently sponsors events like Detroit Startup Week and Techweek Detroit. They plan to continue their tech advocacy with new programs like Tech Talks featuring local and global experts.

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I like what DUO is doing in Michigan. We use their product and it works great! We have been using DUO for over 2 years now. I get very little push back from 3rd party vendors when I require them to use DUO to log in remotely.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

 

DIY Ransomware

DIY RansomwareSophos has recently uncovered a new trend of cyber DIY’ers who are breaking into computers one at a time and manually running ransomware on them. Apparently, these purveyors of bespoke malware are tired of the mass distribution channels employed by WannaCry and NotPetya.

cybercriminalWhy bother using stolen NSA exploits or sending millions of booby-trapped email attachments when you can do it yourself. For whatever reason, some cyber-criminals have decided that if you want something doing properly, you have to do it yourself.

The Naked Security blog points out that many companies, notably small businesses, outsource their IT to, or pay for lots of help from, outside contractors. These contractors might live in another part of town, or elsewhere in the country, or even on the other side of the world. To let remote sysadmins look after your Windows networks, the most widely used tool is Microsoft‘s (MSFT) own Remote Desktop Protocol or RDP for short.

Microsoft Remote Desktop ProtocolFor those who haven’t used it, the author describes RDP as a tool that allows remote use even of fully graphical applications that can’t be scripted or operated via a command prompt. They can work like being right on-site.  That means that the RDP password you’ve chosen for your remote sysadmin (or that you’ve let them choose for themselves) is essentially the key to your office – a weak password is like a server room door that’s propped open, inviting any passing snooper to take a look inside.

brute force attackSo, if the crooks using a network search engine such as Shodan, notice that you’ve got RDP open to the internet, they’ll take a poke around. Sophos security experts who’ve investigated a number of recent RDP attacks have often found evidence that a tool called NLBrute was used to try a whole range of RDP passwords – a so-called brute force attack – in the hope of sneaking in.

Once they’ve got your RDP password – whether they use NLBrute, or simply look you up on Facebook to find your birthday and your pet’s name – they’ll log on and immediately create various brand new administrative accounts. That way, even if you get rid of the crooks and change your own admin password, they’ve already got backup accounts they can use to sneak back in later.

Here’s what you can expect to happen next, based on what Sophos has seen in the attacks they have investigated:

Female hacker - teachprivacy.comStep 1: The crooks download and install low-level system tweaking software, such as the popular Process Hacker tool. Tools of this sort are regularly used by legitimate sysadmins for troubleshooting and emergency recovery. The bad guys can also use it for no good. They can modify the operating system, kill off processes, delete files, and change configuration settings that are usually locked down.

Step 2: The cybercriminals turn off or reconfigure anti-malware software, using the newly installed tweaking tools.

Step 3: The bad guys go after the passwords of administrator accounts. If they can’t get an admin password, they may try logging in as a regular user and running hacking tools that try to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities to get what’s called EoP, or elevation of privilege.

EoP means that already logged-on users can sneakily promote themselves to more powerful accounts to boost their powers. Sophos has seen EoP tools left on attacked systems that tried to abuse vulnerabilities dubbed CVE-2017-0213 patched by Microsoft in May 2017 and CVE-2016-0099, patched by Microsoft back in March 2016.

database servers

Step 4: The crooks turn off database services (e.g. SQL) so that vital database files can be attacked by malware. Files such as SQL databases are usually locked while the database server software is active, as a precaution against corruption that could be caused by concurrent access by another program. The side-effect of this is that malware can’t get direct access to database files either, and therefore can’t scramble them to hold them to ransom.

Step 5: The crooks turn off Volume Shadow Copy (the Windows live backup service) and delete any existing backup files.  Shadow copies act as real-time, online backups that can make recovery from ransomware a quick and easy process. That’s why crooks often go looking for shadow copies first to remove them.

Step 6: The crooks upload and run ransomware of their choice. Because these DIY criminals have used their illegitimate sysadmin powers to rig the system to be as insecure as they can, they can often use older versions of ransomware, perhaps even variants that other crooks have given up on and that are now floating around the internet “for free”.

These bespoke hacks mean the crooks don’t have to worry about using the latest and greatest malware, or setting up a command-and-control server, or running a hit-and-hope spam campaign.

In one attack, Sophos saw a folder on the desktop containing four different types of ransomware. The crooks ran each in turn until one of them worked.

Many ransomware attacks are distributed indiscriminately, and therefore rely on a “pay page” – a Dark Web server set up specially to tell victims how much to pay, and how to pay it.

But the author notes these RDP crooks are already personally involved to the extent of logging into your network themselves, so there’s often what you might call a “personal touch”.

Pay ransomware in bitcoinRather than automatically squeezing you via a website, the blog says you’ll probably see a pop-up telling you to make contact via email to “negotiate” the release of your data. At the time of writing the Bitcoin address used by that attacker contained BTC 9.62, with 1 bitcoin valued at $11,388.33 (11-28-2017) currently worth almost $110,000.

The Sophos investigators found that the victims of this kind of attack are almost always small-to-medium companies: the largest business in our investigation had 120 staff, but most had 30 or fewer. With small-scale comes a dependence on external IT suppliers or “jack-of-all-trades” IT generalists trying to manage cybersecurity along with many other responsibilities.

In one case a victim was attacked repeatedly, because of a weak password used by a third-party application that demanded 24-hour administrator access for its support staff.

Sophos recommends these steps to cut your risk of becoming a victim of DIY Ransomware:

  1. If you don’t need RDP, make sure it’s turned off on every computer on the network: RDP can be used to connect to servers, desktops, and laptops.
  2. Consider using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) for connections from outside your network. A VPN requires outsiders to authenticate with the firewall first and to connect from there to internal services. This means software such as RDP never needs to be exposed directly to the internet.
  3. Use two-factor authentication (2FA) wherever you can. To log on with 2FA you need a one-time logon code every time. If crooks steal or guess your password, it’s no use on its own.
  4. Patch early, patch often. This prevents crooks from exploiting vulnerabilities against your network reducing your exposure to danger.
  5. After an attack, check to see what the crooks have changed. Don’t just remove the malware or apply the missed patches and be done with it. Especially check for added applications, altered security settings, and newly created user accounts.
  6. Set a lockout policy to limit password guessing attacks. With three guesses at a time followed by a five-minute lockout, a crook can only try out 12 × 3 = 36 passwords an hour, which makes a brute force attack impractical.
  7. If you’re using a third-party IT company and they haven’t already suggested the precautions Sophos listed above, why not ask them why, and ask yourself if they’re the right people to be looking after your network?

Related article

  • Hackers have cashed out on $143,000 of bitcoin from the massive WannaCry ransomware attack (CNBC)

 

Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

Your Mobile is Leaking SS7

Your Mobile is Leaking SS7There is a vulnerability in the global phone system. The flaw allows hackers to access telephone data using nothing but a phone number. The flaw is in the Signaling System 7 (PDF) or SS7. SS7 is a set of telephony signaling protocols that exchanges information on telephone networks.

Listening to phone callsThe Register points out that SS7 signaling technology was developed in the 1970s. It hasn’t been updated, since the systems became accessible over the internet. The weakness in SS7 allows hackers or TLA’s to exploit the vulnerability with the phone number of the user they’re targeting. The flaw allows them to listen to phone calls, read text messages and track the user’s location.

The SS7 flaw

A white paper (PDF) by independent cyber-security company Positive Technologies explains.

The process of placing voice calls in modern mobile networks is still based on SS7 technology which dates back to the 1970s. At that time, safety protocols involved physical security of hosts and communication channels, making it impossible to obtain access to an SS7 network through a remote unauthorized host. In the early 21st century, a set of signaling transport protocols called SIGTRAN were developed. SIGTRAN is an extension to SS7 that allows the use of IP networks to transfer messages.

However, even with these new specifications, security vulnerabilities within SS7 protocols remained. As a result, an intruder is able to send, intercept and alter SS7 messages by executing various attacks against mobile networks and their subscribers.

The real-world result of the SS7 flaw as Alex Mathews, technical manager EMEA of Seoul Korea-based Positive Technologies explained is.

Chat applications such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and others use SMS verification based on text messages using SS7 signaling to verify the identity of users/numbers.

SMS verification based on text messages using SS7 signallingSMS authentication is one of the major security mechanisms for services like WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, Facebook (FB), and is also part of second-factor authentication for Google (GOOG) accounts, etc. Devices and applications send SMS messages via the SS7 network to verify identity, and an attacker can easily intercept these and assume the identity of the legitimate user. Having done so, the attacker can read and write messages as if they are the intended recipient.

If chat history is stored on the server, this information can also be retrieved.

60 Minutes hacks SS7

The hack first came to light in 2014. Security researcher Karsten Nohl demonstrated the SS7 flaw at a convention in Germany according to FierceWireless. CBS 60 Minutes (rb- That’s still on?) caused a mild ripple after they ran a story on the flaw. The program engaged Mr. Nohl to demonstrate the vulnerability. He was able to track a new iPhone that had been given to U.S. Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA).

Mr. Lieu, who holds a degree in computer science from Stanford, agreed to use the phone to talk to his staff knowing it would be hacked. From his office in Berlin, Mr. Nohl was able to access Rep. Lieu’s phone. He tracked the representative’s movements in Los Angeles, read messages, and recorded phone calls between Representative Lieu and his staff.

record phone callsCBS correspondent Sharyn Alfonsi contacted representatives from CTIA for comment on the story. The CTIA said that there have been reports of SS7-related security breaches abroad. She stated, “… but (they) assured us that all U.S. cellphone networks were secure.” Despite the fact that Mr. Lieu was on a U.S. network when his phone was hacked from Germany.

An open secret

The flaw “is an open secret among the world’s intelligence agencies — including ours — and they don’t necessarily want that hole plugged,” Ms. Alfonsi reported. The four major U.S. wireless operators declined to discuss more specific questions from FierceWireless. When asked whether the flaw may threaten the privacy and security of subscribers, AT&T (T) and Verizon (VZ) deferred to CTIA. Sprint (S) and T-Mobile (TMUS) declined to discuss SS7.

Listen to phnoe callsRepresentative Lieu has called for a congressional investigation of the vulnerabilities in SS7. He wrote that “The applications for this vulnerability are seemingly limitless, from criminals monitoring individual targets to foreign entities conducting economic espionage on American companies to nation states monitoring U.S. government officials.” Lieu said the investigation should be conducted by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, of which he is a member.

Investigate the flaws in SS7

The Register reports that Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) recently joined Representative Lieu to investigate the flaws in SS7. The pair plan to send an open letter [PDF] to Homeland Security. They want an update from Secretary John Kelly on DHS’s progress in addressing the SS7 design shortcomings. It also asks why the agency isn’t doing more to alert the public about the issue. The letter states in part:

We suspect that most Americans simply have no idea how easy it is for a relatively sophisticated adversary to track their movements, tap their calls, and hack their smartphones. … We are also concerned that the government has not adequately considered the counterintelligence threat posed by SS7-enabled surveillance.

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It is important to understand that the wired and wireless telephone network that your phone connects to is not secure. They probably never will be.

Telephone networks were not designed to be secure.

In the most recent draft of the new Digital Identity Guidelines requirements from NIST warns that:

Note: Out-of-band authentication using the PSTN (SMS or voice) is discouraged and is being considered for removal in future editions of this guideline.

You really have to wonder if this is related to the SS7 hole and why it is only being considered for removal. Maybe some of its TLA friends want the hole to stay in place.

I previously covered the SS7 flaw implications to SMS here.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

More IRS Tech Troubles

More IRS Tech TroublesThe U.S. gooberment agency in charge of extorting collecting taxes from citizens, but not businesses, has more IT troubles. In the past, the IRS has had problems with hackers attacking its online systems which exposed more than 720,000 taxpayer accounts. It has had data breaches that released 101,000 taxpayer SSNs, Its internal processes are so weak that the IRS could not find 1,300 PC’s to complete the upgrade from Windows XP.

collecting taxes from citizens, but not businessThe latest report says that the IRS off-boarding processes are so porous that former employees have “unauthorized entry.” Former employees have access to workplaces, IRS computers, taxpayer information, and could allow them to misrepresent themselves to taxpayers, according to an article at Nextgov.

The article cites a new watchdog report. In the report, there was a random sampling in 2014 that said the IRS couldn’t verify it had recovered all security items from more than 66 percent of roughly 4,100 “separated” employees. The employees had left due to retirement, resignation, death, etc.

If the IRS had just checked with me, this would not have been a surprise. In 2014 wrote about this issue. Lieberman Software released the results of a survey of IT security professionals. 13% of IT Pros at the RSA Conference 2014 admitted to being able to access previous employers’ systems using their old credentials. Perhaps even more alarming is that of those able to access previous employers’ systems nearly 23% can get into their previous two employers’ systems using old credentials.

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two factor authenticationThis is just another example of why passwords suck. If the tax collectors used a two-factor authentication (2FA) process, chances are must greater that ex-employees would not be able to access taxpayer’s records. Two-factor authentication is a security process where the user provides two means of identification from separate categories of credentials. 

An authentication factor is an independent category of credentials used for identity verification. The three most common categories are often described as something you know (the knowledge factor), something you have (the possession factor), and something you are (the inheritance factor). For systems with more demanding requirements for security, location and time are sometimes added as fourth and fifth factors.

One rising authentication measure is biometrics. Biometrics is the measurement and statistical analysis of people’s physical and behavioral characteristics. The technology is mainly used for identification and access control. The basic premise of biometric authentication is that everyone is unique and an individual can be identified by his or her intrinsic physical or behavioral traits. An individual’s biometric uniqueness can fulfill the inheritance factor of identify verification (“something you are”). Using biometrics in its various forms (I have written about different forms of biometrics on the Bach Seatvoice, brain waves, retina scan, behavioral biometrics, etc.) when combined with a strong password can form a 2FA.

There are drawbacks to using biometrics for authentication too.

Related articles
  • Global Two-factor Biometrics Industry to Grow at a CAGR of 22.87% to 2020 (newsmaker.com.au)

 

Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.