Tag Archive for NIST

Why Do We Call Them Uppercase?

Why Do We Call Them Upper Case?The typical U.S. user can have up to 130 online accounts and hopefully, they have 130 different passwords on these accounts. When setting up the 130 different passwords on these 130 accounts – you have undoubtedly seen the hate message

Password must include at least one upper case letter, one lower case letter, a number, and a special character.

Why is it called an uppercase or lowercase letter?

It is Gutenberg’s fault

Printing pressThe story goes back to Gutenberg‘s innovation of moveable type and the printing press (1450 A.D.). With Gutenberg’s printing press the compositor (“person who sets the type or text for printing”) stored the individual pieces of metal type in boxes called cases. The smaller letters (along with the type for punctuation and spaces), which were used most often, were kept in a lower case that was easier to reach. Capital letters, which were used less frequently, were kept in an upper case. Because of this old storage convention, we still refer to small letters as lowercase and capital letters as uppercase.

Upper print type case

Lower  print type case

Notice the uppercase letters had slots of equal size, while the lowercase letters (more often used) had slots proportional to their frequency of use (in English). 

The terms quickly became convention, because then a typesetter from one press could quickly adapt to another press. Now the terms are so generic that they are used even in handwriting instruction.

 

No more uppercase in passwords

use longer passwords or passphrases of 15 or more characters without requiring uppercase, lowercase or special charactersFortunately, the tide against using case as a password complexity factor has turned. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) now recommends everyone use longer passwords or passphrases of 15 or more characters without requiring uppercase, lowercase or special characters. NIST 800-63B says enforcing unnecessary password complexity requiring a mix of special characters, numbers and uppercase letters is a practice that can stop.

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The distinction between uppercase and lowercase letters doesn’t exist in all languages, though. Certain Eastern and Asian writing systems, including certain Indian, Chinese, and Japanese alphabets, do not distinguish between uppercase and lowercase letters.

Stay safe out there!

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

No Love for 2FA

No Love for 2FAEveryone has gone to the ATM to grab some cash. Swipe your card – enter your PIN and out comes your cash. We have been doing this for years. Using the ATM is one of the most established uses of the IT security best practice of two-factor authentication (2FA). Lets break that down.

  1. You present your ATM card to the machine (something you have),
  2. Next, you enter a secret PIN (something you know).
  3. Without both of these things (authentication factors), you don’t get your cash.

Two-factor authentication (2FA) provides an extra layer of protection for system access, by asking a user for a second means of identification. 2FA also called multi-factor authentication (MFA), requires at least two authentication factors, including:

  • authentication factorsA knowledge factor (something only the user knows, such as an ATM PIN);
  • A possession factor (something only the user has, such as an ATM card);
  • An inheritance factor (something the user is a fingerprint or retina pattern).

The most popular forms of 2FA include answers to secret questions, a code sent to your phone, or one-time password-generating tokens.

Two-factor authentication2FA is a way to mitigate risks associated with unauthorized access, especially in the current COVID-19 era of increased work from home (WFA). And yet, despite these benefits. Computer Economics has posted a report, Two-Factor Authentication Adoption, and Best Practices, which studied the adoption and practice of 2FA. The report says that firms are not using 2FA to the extent they should be to ensure organizational security:

  • 18% do not use 2FA;
  • 25% are implementing 2FA for the first time;
  • 34% practice 2FA formally and consistently.

Why is 2FA needed? Because as followers of the Bach Seat know, username and password pairs as authentication factors suck. CE writes that passwords can be “phished,” stolen, discovered, and cracked in many ways. Humans are as bad at making good passwords and changing them regularly as they are at eating their daily requirement of vegetables.

In the presser Tom Dunlap, director of research for Computer Economics, said,2FA can go a long way to protecting a company

The big picture is that 2FA is inconvenient, and users just want access … Users often rebel against it because the extra layer is seen as onerous or unnecessary.  However … companies face a wide array of security and privacy threats and 2FA can go a long way to protecting a company

Inconvenience isn’t the only issue. As I have chronicled on the Bach Seat each form of two-factor authentication has its own weaknesses. For instance, security questions can often be easily guessed. tokens can be lost and SMS can be hacked.

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Another issue with 2FA is that it is unevenly implemented and there’s no central place to check if a firm has enabled it on its public-facing site. However, a website, Two Factor Auth (2FA) is trying to fill that void. Two Factor Auth (2FA) is a list of websites and whether or not they support 2FA.

Most of the well-known and commonly used sites and services are listed. The site explains what types of 2FA the firm supports. There’s even a Twitter or Facebook link where you can poke them on social media to start using 2FA – if they don’t support 2FA.

Only 1/3 of firms love two-factor authentication to use it well, despite the security benefits it provides to the firm and their customers.

Stay safe out there!

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

Password Reset Practices “Obsolete”

Password Reset Practices "Obsolete" Followers of the Bach Seat know that passwords suck. And now Microsoft (MSFT) has joined me in that revelation. The boys in Redmond recently recommended that organizations no longer force employees to change their password every 60 days.

Microsoft logoIn a TechNet blog penned by Aaron Margosis, a principal consultant for Microsoft, the company called the practice – once a cornerstone of enterprise identity management – “ancient and obsolete” as it told IT, administrators, that other approaches are much more effective in keeping users safe.

Periodic password expiration is an ancient and obsolete mitigation of very low value, and we don’t believe it’s worthwhile for our baseline to enforce any specific value

Windows-10-logoIn the latest security configuration baseline for Windows 10, which allows administrators to use Microsoft-recommended GPO baselines for improving the overall security posture of a system and reduce a Windows 10 machine’s attack surface, “May 2019 Update” (1903) – (available as a ZIP file for download here) Microsoft dropped the idea that passwords should be frequently changed. Previous baselines had advised enterprises to mandate a password change every 60 days. (And that was down from an earlier 90 days.)

Mr. Margosis acknowledged that policies to automatically expire passwords – and other group policies that set security standards – are often misguided. He wrote,

The small set of ancient password policies enforceable through Windows’ security templates is not and cannot be a complete security strategy for user credential management … Better practices, however, cannot be expressed by a set value in a group policy and coded into a template.

Multi-factor authenticationAmong those other, better practices, Mr. Margosis mentioned multi-factor authentication – also known as two-factor authentication – and banning weak, vulnerable, easily guessed, or frequently revealed passwords.

ComputerWorld points out that Microsoft is not the first to doubt the convention. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) made similar arguments as it downgraded regular password replacement. “Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically),” NIST said in a FAQ that accompanied the June 2017 version of SP 800-63, “Digital Identity Guidelines,” using the term “memorized secrets” in place of “passwords.”

Then, the institute had explained why mandated password changes were a bad idea this way:

Users tend to choose weaker memorized secrets when they know that they will have to change them in the near future. When those changes do occur, they often select a secret that is similar to their old memorized secret by applying a set of common transformations such as increasing a number in the password.

NIST logoBoth the NIST and Microsoft urged organizations to require password resets when there is evidence that the passwords had been stolen or otherwise compromised. And if they haven’t been touched? “If a password is never stolen, there’s no need to expire it,” Microsoft’s Margosis said.

John Pescatore, the director of emerging security trends at the SANS Institute told ComputerWorld;

I agree 100% with Microsoft’s logic for enterprises, which are who uses [group policies] anyway … Forcing every employee to change passwords at some arbitrary period almost invariably causes more vulnerabilities to appear in the password reset process (because there are now frequent spikes of users forgetting their passwords) which increases risk more than the forced password reset ever decreases it.

hobgoblins of little mindsLike Microsoft and NIST, SAN’s Pescatore thought periodic password resets are the hobgoblins of little minds, “Having [this] as part of the baseline makes it easier for security teams to claim compliance because auditors are happy,” Pescatore told ComputerWorld. “Focusing on password reset compliance was a huge part of all the money wasted on Sarbanes-Oxley audits 15 years ago. A great example of how compliance does not equal security.”

ComputerWorld notes other changes in the Windows 10 1903 draft baseline, Microsoft also dropped policies for the BitLocker drive encryption method and its cipher strength. The prior recommendation was to use the strongest available BitLocker encryption, but that, Microsoft said, was overkill: (“Our crypto experts tell us that there is no known danger of [128-bit encryption] being broken in the foreseeable future,” MSFT’s Margosis told ComputerWorld.) And it could easily degrade device performance.

Microsoft is also looking for feedback on a proposed change that would drop the forced disabling of Windows’ built-in Guest and Administrator accounts. Microsoft’s Margosis hedged a bit;

Removing these settings from the baseline would not mean that we recommend that these accounts be enabled, nor would removing these settings mean that the accounts will be enabled,”Removing the settings from the baselines would simply mean that administrators could now choose to enable these accounts as needed.

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We have covered this before, forcing users to change passwords over short time-frames inevitably leads to users choosing the simplest, most memorable, and most crackable passwords possible. Things have changed over the years, including technology that now enables threat actors to crack simplistic passwords easily.

MSFT is now actively pushing MFA in the enterprise so it is not surprising they are going away from this general password policy.

MSFT changing its security baselines won’t change requirements made by regulatory authorities (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOX, NERC) and auditors. It takes years and years for them to change.

The change does not affect home users – but maybe it will make them think?

Slowly the world of passwords is starting to come under control.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

Your Mobile is Leaking SS7

Your Mobile is Leaking SS7There is a vulnerability in the global phone system. The flaw allows hackers to access telephone data using nothing but a phone number. The flaw is in the Signaling System 7 (PDF) or SS7. SS7 is a set of telephony signaling protocols that exchanges information on telephone networks.

Listening to phone callsThe Register points out that SS7 signaling technology was developed in the 1970s. It hasn’t been updated, since the systems became accessible over the internet. The weakness in SS7 allows hackers or TLA’s to exploit the vulnerability with the phone number of the user they’re targeting. The flaw allows them to listen to phone calls, read text messages and track the user’s location.

The SS7 flaw

A white paper (PDF) by independent cyber-security company Positive Technologies explains.

The process of placing voice calls in modern mobile networks is still based on SS7 technology which dates back to the 1970s. At that time, safety protocols involved physical security of hosts and communication channels, making it impossible to obtain access to an SS7 network through a remote unauthorized host. In the early 21st century, a set of signaling transport protocols called SIGTRAN were developed. SIGTRAN is an extension to SS7 that allows the use of IP networks to transfer messages.

However, even with these new specifications, security vulnerabilities within SS7 protocols remained. As a result, an intruder is able to send, intercept and alter SS7 messages by executing various attacks against mobile networks and their subscribers.

The real-world result of the SS7 flaw as Alex Mathews, technical manager EMEA of Seoul Korea-based Positive Technologies explained is.

Chat applications such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and others use SMS verification based on text messages using SS7 signaling to verify the identity of users/numbers.

SMS verification based on text messages using SS7 signallingSMS authentication is one of the major security mechanisms for services like WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, Facebook (FB), and is also part of second-factor authentication for Google (GOOG) accounts, etc. Devices and applications send SMS messages via the SS7 network to verify identity, and an attacker can easily intercept these and assume the identity of the legitimate user. Having done so, the attacker can read and write messages as if they are the intended recipient.

If chat history is stored on the server, this information can also be retrieved.

60 Minutes hacks SS7

The hack first came to light in 2014. Security researcher Karsten Nohl demonstrated the SS7 flaw at a convention in Germany according to FierceWireless. CBS 60 Minutes (rb- That’s still on?) caused a mild ripple after they ran a story on the flaw. The program engaged Mr. Nohl to demonstrate the vulnerability. He was able to track a new iPhone that had been given to U.S. Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA).

Mr. Lieu, who holds a degree in computer science from Stanford, agreed to use the phone to talk to his staff knowing it would be hacked. From his office in Berlin, Mr. Nohl was able to access Rep. Lieu’s phone. He tracked the representative’s movements in Los Angeles, read messages, and recorded phone calls between Representative Lieu and his staff.

record phone callsCBS correspondent Sharyn Alfonsi contacted representatives from CTIA for comment on the story. The CTIA said that there have been reports of SS7-related security breaches abroad. She stated, “… but (they) assured us that all U.S. cellphone networks were secure.” Despite the fact that Mr. Lieu was on a U.S. network when his phone was hacked from Germany.

An open secret

The flaw “is an open secret among the world’s intelligence agencies — including ours — and they don’t necessarily want that hole plugged,” Ms. Alfonsi reported. The four major U.S. wireless operators declined to discuss more specific questions from FierceWireless. When asked whether the flaw may threaten the privacy and security of subscribers, AT&T (T) and Verizon (VZ) deferred to CTIA. Sprint (S) and T-Mobile (TMUS) declined to discuss SS7.

Listen to phnoe callsRepresentative Lieu has called for a congressional investigation of the vulnerabilities in SS7. He wrote that “The applications for this vulnerability are seemingly limitless, from criminals monitoring individual targets to foreign entities conducting economic espionage on American companies to nation states monitoring U.S. government officials.” Lieu said the investigation should be conducted by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, of which he is a member.

Investigate the flaws in SS7

The Register reports that Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) recently joined Representative Lieu to investigate the flaws in SS7. The pair plan to send an open letter [PDF] to Homeland Security. They want an update from Secretary John Kelly on DHS’s progress in addressing the SS7 design shortcomings. It also asks why the agency isn’t doing more to alert the public about the issue. The letter states in part:

We suspect that most Americans simply have no idea how easy it is for a relatively sophisticated adversary to track their movements, tap their calls, and hack their smartphones. … We are also concerned that the government has not adequately considered the counterintelligence threat posed by SS7-enabled surveillance.

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It is important to understand that the wired and wireless telephone network that your phone connects to is not secure. They probably never will be.

Telephone networks were not designed to be secure.

In the most recent draft of the new Digital Identity Guidelines requirements from NIST warns that:

Note: Out-of-band authentication using the PSTN (SMS or voice) is discouraged and is being considered for removal in future editions of this guideline.

You really have to wonder if this is related to the SS7 hole and why it is only being considered for removal. Maybe some of its TLA friends want the hole to stay in place.

I previously covered the SS7 flaw implications to SMS here.

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.

Stop using SMS for Two-Factor Authentication

Stop using SMS for Two-Factor AuthenticationFollowers of the Bach Seat know that passwords suck and no longer provide reliable security. Because automated mass cybercrime attacks are hammering businesses daily, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is disrupting the online security status–quo. According to InfoWorld, the US government’s standards body has decided that passwords are not good enough anymore. NIST now wants government agencies to use two-factor authentication (2FA) to secure applications, networks, and systems.

NIST logoTwo-factor authentication is a security process where the user provides two means of identification from separate categories of credentials. The first is typically something you have, a physical token, such as a card. The second is usually something you know like a PIN number.

The proposed standard discourages organizations from sending special codes via SMS messages. Many services offer two-factor authentication. They ask users to enter a one-time passcode sent via SMS into the app or site to verify the transaction. The author writes that weaknesses in the SMS mechanism concern NIST.

NIST now recommends that developers use tokens and software cryptographic authenticators instead of SMS to deliver special codes. They wrote in a draft version of the DAG; “OOB [out of band] using SMS is deprecated and will no longer be allowed in future releases of this guidance.”

Short Message Service (SMS)Federal agencies must use applications that conform to NIST guidelines. This means for software to be sold to federal agencies, it must follow NIST guidelines. InfoWorld says this is especially relevant for secure electronic communications.

SMS-based Two-Factor Authentication is considered insecure by NIST for a number of reasons. First, someone other than the user may be in possession of the phone. The author says an attacker with a stolen phone would be able to trigger the login request. In some cases, the contents of the text message appear on the lock screen, which means the code is exposed to anyone who glances at the screen.

SMS based two-factor authentication (2FA)InfoWorld says that NIST isn’t deprecating SMS-based methods simply because someone may be able to intercept the codes by taking control of the handset, that risk also exists with tokens and software authenticators. The main reason NIST appears to be down on SMS is that it is insecure over VoIP.

The author says there has been a significant increase in attacks targeting SMS-based two-factor authentication recently. SMS messages can be hijacked over some VoIP services. SMS messages delivered through VoIP are only as secure as the websites and systems of the VoIP provider. If an attacker can hack the VoIP servers or network they can intercept the SMS security codes or have them rerouted to her own phone. Security researchers have used weaknesses in the SMS protocol to remotely interact with applications on the target phone and compromise users.

Signalling System 7 (SS7) Sophos’ Naked Security Blog further explains some of the risks. There is malware that can redirect text messages. There are attacks against the This hack

Mobile phone number portability also poses a problem for SMS security. Sophos says that phone ports, also known as SIM swaps can make SMS insecure. SIM swap attacks are where an attacker convinces your mobile provider to issue you a new SIM card to replace one that’s been lost, damaged, stolen or that is the wrong size for your new phone.

SIM swap attacksSophos also says in many places it is very easy for criminals to convince a mobile phone store to transfer someone’s phone number to a new SIM and therefore hijacking all their text messages.

ComputerWorld highlights a recent attack that used social engineering to bypass Google’s two-factor authentication. Criminals sent users text messages informing them that someone was trying to break into their Gmail accounts and that they should enter the passcode to temporarily lock the account. The passcode, which was a real code generated by Google when the attackers tried to log in, arrived in a separate text message, and users who didn’t realize the first message was not legitimate would pass the unique code on to the criminals.

NIST’s decision to deprecate SMS two-factor Passwordauthentication is a smart one,” said Keith Graham, CTO of authentication provider SecureAuth. “The days of vanilla two-factor approaches are no longer enough for security.

For now, applications and services using SMS-based authentication can continue to do so as long as it isn’t a service that virtualizes phone numbers. Developers and application owners should explore other options, including dedicated two-factor apps. One example is Google Authenticator, which uses a secret key and time to generate a unique code locally on the device for the user to enter into the application.

Hardware tokens such as RSA’s SecurID display a Hardware tokens new code every few seconds. A hardware security dongle such as YubiKey, used by many companies including Google and GitHub, supports one-time passwords, public-key encryption, and authentication. Knowing that NIST is not very happy with SMS will push the authentication industry towards more secure options.

Many popular services and applications offer only SMS-based authentication, including Twitter and online banking services from major banks. Once the NIST guidelines are final, these services will have to make some changes.

Fingerprint RecognitionMany developers are increasingly looking at fingerprint recognition. ComputerWorld says this is because the latest mobile devices have fingerprint sensors. Organizations can also use adaptive authentication techniques, such as layering device recognition, geo-location, login history, or even behavioral biometrics to continually verify the true identity of the user, SecureAuth’s Graham said.

NIST acknowledged that biometrics is becoming more widespread as a method for authentication, but refrained from issuing a full recommendation. The recommendation was withheld because biometrics aren’t considered secret and can be obtained and forged by attackers through various methods.

Biometric methods are acceptable only when used with another authentication factor, according to the draft guidelines. NIST wrote in the DAG;

[Biometrics] can be obtained online or by taking a picture of someone with a camera phone (e.g. facial images) with or without their knowledge, lifted from objects someone touches (e.g., latent fingerprints), or captured with high-resolution images (e.g., iris patterns for blue eyes)

Biometrics

At this point, it appears NIST is moving away from recommending SMS-based authentication as a secure method for out-of-band verification. They are soliciting feedback from partners and NIST stakeholders on the new standard. They told InfoWorld, “It only seemed appropriate for us to engage where so much of our community already congregates and collaborates.

You can review the draft of Special Publication 800-63-3: Digital Authentication Guidelines on Github or on NIST’s website until Sept. 17. Sophos recommends security researcher Jim Fenton’s presentation from the PasswordsCon event in Las Vegas that sums up the changes.

VentureBeat offers some suggestions to replace your SMS system:

  • Hardware tokens that generate time-based codes.
  • Apps that generate time-based codes, such as the Google Authenticator app or RSA SecurID,
  • Hardware dongles based on the U2F standard.
  • Systems that use push notifications to your phone.

 

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Ralph Bach has been in IT long enough to know better and has blogged from his Bach Seat about IT, careers, and anything else that catches his attention since 2005. You can follow him on LinkedInFacebook, and Twitter. Email the Bach Seat here.